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ABSTRACT
Systems can become misconfigured for a variety of reasons such as
operator errors or buggy patches. When a misconfiguration is dis-
covered, usually the first order of business is to restore availability,
often by undoing the misconfiguration. To simplify this task, we
propose the Statistical Analysis for Identifying Configuration Files
(SAIC), which analyzes how the contents of a file changes over time
to automatically determine which files contain configuration state.
In this way, SAIC reduces the number of files a user must manu-
ally examine during recovery and allows versioning file systems to
make more efficient use of their versioning storage.
The two key insights that enable SAIC to identify configuration
files are that configuration state must persist across executions of
an application and that configuration state changes at a slower
rate than other types of application state. SAIC applies these in-
sights through a set of filters, which eliminate non-persistent files
from consideration, and a novel similarity metric, which measures
how similar a file’s versions are to each other. Together, these two
mechanisms enable SAIC to identify all 72 configuration files out of
2363 versioned files from 6 common applications in two user traces,
while mistaking only 33 non-configuration files as configuration
files, which allows a versioning file system to eliminate roughly
66% of non-configuration file versions from its logs, thus reducing
the number of file versions that a user must try to recover from a
misconfiguration.
1 INTRODUCTION
Configuration management is the bane of system administration.
An application can become misconfigured due to a multitude of
causes – human error, incorrect patches or buggy software, just to
name a few. In addition, misconfigurations are not always immedi-
ately obvious and may only affect an application when used in a
certain way. As a result, the cause and symptom of a misconfigura-
tion can be separated by weeks or even months.
When a misconfiguration is discovered, often the system admin-
istrator’s immediate priority is to restore availability to the system.
While the ideal solution is to fix the misconfiguration, configuration
debugging is a laboriously slow process. Therefore, a more short-
term and realistic goal is to roll the broken application back to the
state just before the misconfiguration occurred. Finding this state
may also provide clues on how to find a more permanent fix for the
misconfiguration. Many systems facilitate configuration rollback by
providing some capability for recording and rolling back the state
of the file system. For example, Windows Vista comes with Shadow
Copy disks [32] and Mac OS includes Time Machine [21], both of
which take block level snapshots of an entire disk. Such systematic
solutions are frequently combined with ad-hoc “best practices”,
such as keeping configuration files under revision control.
However, these solutions are not quite satisfactory for recover-
ing from misconfigurations. Versioning an entire disk or file system
consumes a lot of disk space. As a result, such systems take snap-
shots, so they may miss file versions, and even then, usually can
only maintain several weeks’ worth of versions. In addition, when
a misconfiguration occurs, the user is confronted with a legion
of files and versions within which she must find the cause of the
problem. Thus, current versioning systems will only work if the
cause of the misconfiguration is recent, and still require the user to
try rolling back many different files to find the right one.
Manually maintaining versions in revision control or manual
backup reduces the number of files versioned, saving both space and
effort. However, it requires the user to know the exact location and
number of configuration files for each application. Unfortunately,
configuration complexity has driven more and more application
developers to provide a tool or graphical interface for configuration,
rather than allowing the user to edit configuration state directly.
This effectively abstracts and hides the storage of the configuration
settings from the user. Unlike traditional Linux/UNIX or Windows
applications that store configuration in /etc or in the Windows
registry, these applications have being storing configuration state
in a variety of files that do not have descriptive names. Versioning
file systems, which record versions at the file system level instead
of the block level, can selectively version files on a file system, but
they still place the burden on the user to find the configuration
files [43].
Since we cannot assume that a user knows where the configura-
tion files for her applications are stored, we propose the Statistical
Analysis for Identifying Configuration Files (SAIC), that will auto-
matically find an application’s configuration files for the user. SAIC
treats applications as black-boxes, requiring no a priori knowledge
of the application, and heuristically ranks a file’s likelihood to con-
tain configuration state by observing how it is accessed and how
its content changes over time. It performs a statistical analysis of
how a file’s contents change over time to determine whether the
file stores configuration state or not. The intuition behind this ap-
proach is that configuration state changes very slowly, so that files
that exhibit a high amount of similarity as they are modified are
more likely to contain configuration state. Thus, by measuring the
similarity of a file’s versions, SAIC can assign a score that denotes
the likelihood that a file stores configuration state. This information
is then used to guide a versioning system into selecting which files
to keep and which to discard when it is approaching its space quota.
Having a more accurate picture of which files to version not only
reduces the storage requirements of the versioning system, but also
reduces the effort the user must expend to roll the application back
to a working state and unravel the cause of the misconfiguration.
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1.1 Contributions
This research makes the following three contributions to the area
of configuration management:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, it is the first research that
systematically analyzes the locations, formats, sizes, and
change patterns of configuration files
(2) A novel statistic-based similarity metric to identify config-
uration files for arbitrary applications
(3) A working system that automatically identifies configu-
ration files using the similarity metric and aids a user in
recovering configuration problems
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 8, we provide
the relevant background for the reader. Section 2 characterizes the
problem SAIC faces with identifying configuration files. Section 3
presents our trace-based analysis of configuration files. Section 4
and Section 5 describe SAIC’s solution for identifying configuration
files and which versions hold significant configuration changes.
Finally, we present evaluation results in Section 6 and conclude in
Section 9.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1 What is a Configuration File?
One of the difficulties in dealing with configuration problems is that
the term “configuration file” is itself a nebulous term. To resolve
this difficulty, we begin by defining a configuration file for the
purposes of this thesis. We first introduce the term application
state, which describes persistent state that an application maintains
throughout its lifetime. We then categorize application state as
either task-dependent, time-dependent or configuration state. A task
is an application-specific unit of work, such as navigating to a
web page with a browser, or editing a file with an editor. Thus,
task-dependent state reflects the sequence of tasks an application
has performed – an editor’s list of recently opened files or the
state of a browser’s web cache for example. Time-dependent state
records the passage of time or counts the number of occurrences
of certain events – such as a timer to check for patches or perform
a cleanup. Configuration state defines the application’s behavior
over time and across multiple tasks. With this model consisting of
three types of application state, we can finally give our definition
of a configuration file:
Configuration File: A file that stores applica-
tion state that is neither task-dependent nor time-
dependent, and whose contents may thus affect
an application’s availability or performance over
a period of time and across a number of tasks.
We note that misconfigurations do not necessarily affect all tasks
because not all configuration state is used for every task. Thus,
while configuration state is not task-dependent, the act of accessing
configuration state is. For example, directing a web browser to
view only web pages on the local disk would not reveal problems
stemming from misconfigured web proxy settings.
We found this definition useful when trying to decide whether
a borderline case was a configuration file or not. One such case
was for files whose contents are set by a remote party as opposed
to the user, but which have a configuration-like function for the
application. For example, Firefox periodically downloads a black-
list of phishing sites, which it uses to protect the user. This file’s
contents are neither task- nor time-dependent, but its contents can
affect the usability of Firefox by preventing the user from visiting
even legitimate websites if incorrectly configured. As a result, our
definition considers such files configuration files. If this blacklist
does becomes misconfigured, rolling this blacklist back to an earlier
version will fix the problem – though possibly only temporarily. In
addition, knowing that this file is the cause of a misconfiguration
is valuable to the user. Thus, while our definition is broad, we feel
it does contain most of the files that are of interest to system ad-
ministrators who are trying to debug a misconfigured application.
We concede that this definition also does not cover every possible
source of misconfiguration. For instance, applications may derive
their configuration dynamically from a device or network resource
without actually writing it to the file system. Since SAIC can only
observe configurations saved to disk, it will not be able to analyze
these cases. We leave the debugging of such configuration problems
outside the scope of this thesis.
In addition, an application does not always store all of its con-
figuration state in configuration files. Many applications provide
default values for their configuration parameters. If a configura-
tion parameter has a default value, the applications often do not
store the value in their configuration files, since the default value
of a configuration parameter can be defined as a constant in the
application’s code and thus would probably be saved into the appli-
cation’s executable file. It is also possible that the default value of a
configuration parameter is implied by the logic of the application’s
code. Thus the configuration state of an application includes not
only the configuration states that are stored in the configuration
file, but also those stored directly as constants or indirectly as code
in executable files.
2.2 Identifying Configuration Files
One may ask why it is difficult in the first place for a user to identify
the configuration files of an application. For applications whose con-
figuration files are not meant to be edited manually, the application
developer has no reason to make the location of the configura-
tion files obvious to the user. As a result, relying exclusively on
file names is unreliable. For example, Firefox stores configurations
in files such as pluginreg.dat, secmod.db, prefs.js, localstore.rdf and
mimeTypes.rdf. The Macromedia Flash plugin maintains several
files named settings.sol in various directories, but only one of them
actually contains application configuration data (the others contain
website-specific data). In addition, it appears that for portability
purposes, both of these applications do not use OS-specific con-
ventions for the storage of their configuration state. For example,
rather than using the registry in Windows, Firefox stores all its con-
figuration state in a subdirectory under the user’s home directory,
just as it does on Linux.
Another problem is that configuration files often have a sprin-
kling of time-dependent and task-dependent state mixed in with
the configuration state. For example, Firefox stores timestamps
of events, the period between updates, and the exit status of the
previous execution (i.e. exited cleanly or crashed) in the prefs.js
configuration file. Similarly, the GNOME desktop system records
timestamps in each GNOME application’s %gconf.xml configuration
files. As a result, it is more appropriate to score files by the propor-
tion of configuration state they contain, rather than try and classify
files as entirely configuration or non-configuration. In addition,
while the vast majority of the content in such files is configuration
state, the vast majority of modifications to the files are actually to
these sprinklings of non-configuration state. This adds a great deal
of noise to the file system interaction between an application and
its configuration files.
Finally, we note that configuration files are not always accessed
in a predictable pattern. While many configuration files are read
at start up [14], some applications read their configurations on
demand. For example, Firefox will only access the pluginreg.dat
configuration file if plugins are used or modified. Accesses to such
configuration files occur neither in every execution of an appli-
cation, nor do they occur at the beginning of the execution. As a
result, any heuristic that assumes configuration files are always
read at start up will miss configuration files.
2.3 Misconfiguration Recovery
Unfortunately, without knowledge of which files contain configu-
ration state, recovery from a misconfiguration is a very expensive
task. To illustrate, suppose an application has failed due to a mis-
configuration and the user would like to determine which files
read during the failing run are causing the problem. The user may
profile the failing application to determine which files it accesses,
and then query the versioning system to find all versions of those
files. She may then start rolling back various files, one version at a
time, to see if the problem is fixed. We note that while one could
use binary search to speed up the task of finding a working config-
uration state [53], binary search can only identify a point where
an application transitioned from a working state to a broken state.
Unfortunately, this has the disadvantage that if there was more
than one time in which the application’s configuration state was
not valid, then it cannot guarantee that the working file version it
finds is the most recently working state. Since configuration files
are not modified atomically, there can be many transient periods
when the configuration files are in an invalid state. Thus, the only
way to ensure that the most recent working configuration state is
found is to do a linear search backwards in time from the current
state of the application.
To quantify the difficulty of this task, we collected system traces
from two Linux workstations in our lab. The traces were collected
with a kernel module that intercepts system calls, versions files
using a redo log, and records which applications access each file. A
new file version is created on every write system call or memory
map of a file. In cases where several contiguous writes are made
to a file, this is counted as a single version. Table 1 gives data ex-
tracted from the traces on several applications that were used by the
workstation users. GNOME represents the GNOME suite of desk-
top applications, Flash is the Macromedia Flash plugin, VMware
is VMware workstation, JEdit is a JAVA-based editor and Amarok
is an open-source music player. We describe the applications in
more detail in Appendix A. We note that Trace 1 has less activity
than Trace 2, despite a longer trace period, simply because the user
did not use the machine as much. To determine whether a file that
was accessed contains configuration state, we use a combination of
application documentation and profiling of the application.
The traces show that without knowledge of which files may
contain configuration state, the user would have to sift through
hundreds of files that were accessed and potentially try thousands
of versions to find the most recently working configuration state.
Instead of having to examine each versioned file, knowing which
files are configuration files reduces the number of files the user has
to consider by one to two orders of magnitude. The number of file
versions to try is also reduced by an order of magnitude or more in
most cases and by at least a factor of 2 in the worst case.
In addition, versioning only files that are likely to contain config-
uration state can reduce storage overhead. We estimate the amount
of storage necessary to version each of the traces using the size
of the redo logs from the trace. As shown in Table 2, both traces
would require a significant amount of storage to version all the data
written to the file system over the length of the trace. While one
may argue that storage is cheap, the user effort required to manage
the storage and analyze large amounts of data in the storage is
expensive. Therefore, the ability to separate configuration state
from other types of application state will be beneficial to system
configuration management.
3 CONFIGURATION FILE ANALYSIS
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has systematically
analyzed configuration files. However, we believe this kind of anal-
ysis is necessary to discover an effective and efficient method in
identifying configuration files. In light of that, we analyzed various
aspects such as format and change patterns of configuration files
for 7 popular Linux applications. The goal of our analysis is to find
out how configuration files differ from non-configuration files. Our
analysis aims to answer the following questions.
• Where does an application store its configuration files and
non-configuration files?
• What are the format and size of configuration files and
non-configuration files?
• What are the change patterns of configuration files and
non-configuration files?
3.1 Methodology
We analyze application behaviors that are related with configura-
tion operations in a way similar to black-box testing. We perform
experiments with applications by running them in a controlled
environment to collect the traces of file accesses and file system
changes made by the applications. Then we study the file system
traces from different perspectives in order to understand the nature
of configuration files.
3.2 Trace Collection
We developed a versioning file system from the code base of Foren-
six [18] to collect the trace of each application. The versioning
file system intercepts file system calls and stores every file system
change into versioning logs. Each version log contains versions for
one unique file. The versioning file system creates a new version for
every write operation to a file. It also keeps the history of the file
system calls made by the application. The file system call history
Trace Days Application Non-code files Versioned files Config Versions (config/total)
1 22
Firefox 851 507 7 6485/295841
GNOME 1552 392 16 321/2064
Flash 37 17 1 7/130
VMware 337 189 6 160/2926
2 12
Firefox 1247 568 15 234835/751808
GNOME 2537 493 21 13298/30388
Flash 53 35 1 15/1995
JEdit 6876 73 2 46/5002
Amarok 3086 89 3 43/4782
Table 1: Application file usagemeasurements. For each trace, we give the number of non-code files accessed by the application,
the number of files that have been modified and have versions stored on the system, and the number of configuration files
the application uses. The last column gives the aggregate number of configuration file and total file versions created by the
application over the entire trace.
Trace Days Write ops Bytes Files
1 22 7,884,155 3.01GB 12,983
2 12 62,647,496 21.28GB 96,470
Table 2: Versioning storage overheadmeasurement. We give
the number of write operations, bytes written and number
of files modified in each trace.
is used to determine which files are accessed or updated by which
applications, and when these accesses or updates occur.
To compare how the files are changed with and without configu-
ration related operations, we performed both configuration opera-
tions and other regular operations with the applications. To be able
to easily identify which file changes are related to configuration op-
erations and which file changes are not, we divided our operations
for each application into two phases: a non-configuration phase
and a configuration phase. We first perform regular operations such
as browsing web pages in a web browser or editing documents in
a text editor in the non-configuration phase. We do not perform
any configuration related operations during this phase. To make
the application generates every possible file change, we execute a
variety of different operations with the application. Furthermore,
we execute the operations long enough to ensure the application
produce a reasonably long history of file changes.
We perform configuration operations in the configuration phase
after we finish the non-configuration phase. In the configuration
phase, we try to make every possible configuration change by
modifying the default value of every configuration parameter of the
application from the interface provided by the application. These
changes should be reflected in file system changes that are isolated
from the file system changes in the non-configuration phase by the
time of the changes.
3.3 Trace Analysis
An important objective of our trace analysis is to compare the
change patterns of configuration files and non-configuration files.
We achieve this by tracking the change history of each individual
data entry in a file. A data entry can represent either a configuration
parameter or a non-configuration parameter. We designed a simple
split-and-match algorithm to approximately identify an individual
data entry in a file.
The algorithm first splits a file version into unique data frag-
ments by certain specific delimiters. A data fragment is a series of
contiguous bytes in the file version. It is a particular instance of a
data entry. For example, one configuration file (prefs.js) of Firefox
can have two data fragments, each in a different version. One data
fragment is “user_pref(“javascript.enabled”, true);” and the other
data fragment is “user_pref(“javascript.enabled”, true);”. These two
different data fragments refer to two different values (true and false)
of the same data entry that represents the configuration parameter
with name “javascript.enabled”.
For this study, we choose to use line feed as the delimiter to
split a file version and analyze data changes of ASCII files only.
As we will shown later, almost all configuration files are ASCII
and they usually are organized into lines of text, which contains
the name and the value of a configuration parameter. Many non-
configuration files are also ASCII. So line feed can be used as a
delimiter for most configuration files and many non-configuration
files.
To track the change history of a data entry, we need to find the
data entry to which a data fragment refers to. This is necessary
since a data entry change corresponds to two different values of the
data entry and thus two different data fragments. Failing to match
the two different data fragments that refer to the same data entry,
the data entry change will be recognized as two unrelated events: a
removal of a data entry and a insertion of another data entry. Thus
the data entry change will not be identified correctly.
To solve this problem, we use longest common substrings algo-
rithm [12] to match two different data fragments that refer to the
same data entry. One issue of this method is that two different data
fragments that refer to two different data entries may be incorrectly
matched if they happen to have a long common substring. We
use two orthogonal approaches to eliminate this kind of incorrect
matches. First, a match can only be made between a data fragment
that is removed from a file version, and a data fragment that is added
to the same version. This is because a data entry change means
the data fragment refers to the old value of the data entry will be
replaced by the data fragment refers to the new value of the data
entry in the file version. In addition, two added data fragments
or two removed data fragments can not refer to the same data en-
try, because this means the version contain two different values
of a same data entry, which should not happen for configuration
files. Second, we observed that a configuration file can not have
two data entries that represent the same configuration informa-
tion. Otherwise, the meaning of the configuration information will
be confusing. Therefore, two different data fragments can not be
matched if they ever co-exist in a same file version.
Based on our split-and-match algorithm, we developed a utility
to analyze versioning logs that are generated by our versioning
system. This utility works on one versioning log at a time. It extracts
every version of a file, splits each of them into data fragments, match
a data fragment to a data entry, and builds a database of these data
entries. It tracks every change to each data entry. The utility collects
information on each data entry including how many times the data
entry is added in a version, is deleted from a version, is changed
from one version to the next version, how many versions the data
entry exists in, and the first time the data entry is added, deleted, or
changed. This kinds of information describes the change patterns
of the data entries in a file.
From the system call history, we find out which directories and
files are accessed and updated by which application. For each ap-
plication, we check which files it accessed contain data entries
that are changed only during a configuration phase. These files
are candidate configuration files since we make only configuration
changes in a configuration phase. To determine which files are
exactly configuration files, we manually rollback these candidate
files one by one to the beginning of the configuration phase, and
check if the rollback undo the configuration changes we have made
in the configuration phase. If the rollback of a file undo one or more
configuration changes, the file is identified as a configuration file.
If the rollback of a file does not undo any configuration changes,
this file is identified as a non-configuration file. All the files ac-
cessed by an application which do not contain data entries that
are changed only during a configuration phase will be identified as
non-configuration files.
3.4 Analyzed Applications
We choose 7 popular Linux applications, as shown in Table 3. They
consist of 2 Web browsers, 3 document editors, 1 media player, and
1 Internet messenger. We intentionally select only desktop GUI
applications since it is difficult to identify their configuration files
even manually. The software vendors of these application usually
provide little documentation on which files are configuration files.
3.5 Analysis Results
Our experimentswith these applications are performed on aVMWare
virtual machine that runs Ubuntu 8.10 Linux with kernel 2.6.27. We
choose to use a virtual machine monitor since it is easier for us to
rollback the system to a previous snapshot to undo any unwanted
changes made to the system. In this section, we present our analysis
on the location, format, size, content, and change patterns of the
configuration files of our chosen applications. It should be noted
App. Config Files
Location
Config Files
(ASC/BIN)
Non-config
Files
(ASC/BIN)
Firefox .mozilla 10 3/16
jEdit .jedit 2 9
Amarok .kde 1 0
Opera .opera 3/1 8/13
Texmaker .config 2 0
Openoffice Word .openoffice.org2 12 0
Skype .Skype 1 9
Table 3: Location and format of configuration files. The loca-
tions of configuration files are all relative to a user’s home
directory. It shows the number of ASCII and binary configu-
ration files of each application. It also presents the number
of ASCII and binary non-configuration files.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the sizes of configuration files and
non-configuration files.
that the configuration files and non-configuration files that we dis-
cuss in this section refer to those files of the applications under
our analysis. Specially, the non-configuration files refer to only
the non-configuration files that are stored in the same locations
of the configuration files. We do not consider non-configuration
files which are accessed by the applications and are stored in other
directories for this study.
3.6 File Location and Format
As shown in Table 3, there are 32 configuration files for the 7
applications in total. All applications store their configuration files
under some hidden directories in the user’s home directory. Three
applications have more than one configuration files. All except one
of the configuration files are in ASCII format including XML format.
Only one application does not have any non-configuration files
under the same directory that contains its configuration files. There
are 58 non-configuration files under the same directories of config-
uration files. Half of the non-configuration files are also in ASCII
format.
3.7 File Size
Figure 1 shows the sizes of configuration files and non-configuration
files for all the applications. The sizes of the configuration files are
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Figure 2: Percent of configuration state in all the configura-
tion files.
distributed in three ranges of sizes: below 2KB, between 2KB and
5KB, and above 5KB. Around 35% of configuration files are less than
2KB, while 22% of the configuration files are larger than 5KB. In
contrast, most of the non-configuration files are very small. About
80% of non-configuration files are smaller than 2KB, although the
largest files are non-configuration files.
3.8 Data Entry Type
We classify the type of data entries in a configuration file into either
configuration state or non-configuration state. This data entry type
has no relation with the concept of programming language data
type such as binary, number, or character string. As described
in Section 3.3, we identify configuration files by identifying data
entries changed only during a configuration phase. These data
entries are called configuration data entries and they make up the
configuration state of a file. The percent of configuration state in
a file is defined as the ratio of the number of configuration data
entries to the total number of data entries of a file.
Figure 2 shows the percent of configuration state in each config-
uration file. Half of the configuration files (52%) contain less than
40% configuration state, and 25% the configuration files contain
more than 72% configuration state. In addition, 30% the configu-
ration files are almost entirely composed of configuration state.
This indicates that configuration files contain data related to both
configuration state and non-configuration state. Looking into the
configuration files, we found that the non-configuration state in-
cludes timestamps, list of recently opened files, last user actions,
window size of last execution, temporary file name, debugging
information, and so on.
3.9 Data Fragment Life Time
We measure how much data in a file is changed across the different
versions of a file by using the life time of the data fragments of the
file. A data fragment’s life time is the ratio of the number of versions
in which the data fragment appears, to the number of the total
versions of the file that contains the data fragment. We choose the
configuration file with most versions for each application. Because
some applications do not have non-configuration files under the
directories in which their configuration files exist, we choose two
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non-configuration files for each of the applications that have non-
configuration files. Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the data fragment
life time of the configuration files and the non-configuration files,
respectively. For the configuration files, all except one of the curves
start low and remain flat from the short life time side, and rise
steeply near the longest life time. This means most data fragments
in the configuration files have a long life time. On the contrary,
the curves of the non-configuration files generally rise steeply at
the short life time side, which means most data fragments in the
non-configuration files have a short life time.
3.10 Discussion
The analysis of configuration files illustrates both challenges and
promises of our research in identifying configuration files. First,
applications tend to store many non-configuration files in the same
location where their configuration files are stored, although con-
figuration files are all stored in some hidden directories in the
user’s home directory on Linux. In addition, both configuration
files and non-configuration files can be either ASCII or binary. This
makes it difficult to identify configuration files by their locations
or formats. Second, configuration files usually contain both config-
uration related data and non-configuration related data. It is thus
more appropriate to score configuration files by the proportion of
configuration related data they contain. Finally, the life time of data
fragments in a configuration file is much longer than those in a non-
configuration file. This indicates that configuration files change
much more slowly than non-configuration files. This difference
between configuration files and non-configuration files probably
can be leveraged to identify configuration files.
4 THE DESIGN OF SAIC
4.1 System Model
SAIC has two modes of operation. We assume that the system
already has a versioning facility to record file versions in place.
During regular system operation, SAIC observes file system activ-
ity and assigns a similarity score to each file that the file system
versions. When the versioning file system nears its space quota and
needs to discard file versions to make additional room, it will start
by discarding versions of files with the lowest similarity score first.
In addition, in this mode, the resource requirements of SAIC must
be kept to a minimum since SAIC is sharing compute resources
with other tasks on the machine.
When the user discovers a misconfiguration and wishes to initi-
ate recovery, she switches SAIC into recovery mode. In recovery
mode, the similarity scores are used by the user to identify files
that contain configuration state. The user will begin by selecting
the highest scoring files to try rolling back first, since these are the
files that contain the largest amount of configuration state. SAIC
currently makes the simplifying assumption that configuration files
can be independently rolled back and restricts its applicability to
misconfigurations that can be solved by rolling back a single con-
figuration file. A more complete model would also try rolling back
combinations of configuration files simultaneously in order to find
the most recent working state. In recovery mode, we assume SAIC
will have more resources available to it since this mode is run only
when the user needs SAIC to help recover from a misconfiguration.
SAIC assigns similarity scores in two steps. First, SAIC applies
a set of filters to eliminate files that do not hold application state.
These filters do not examine the contents of the files and thus,
are very efficient. Then, SAIC computes a similarity metric on the
remaining application state files to rank them by the amount of
configuration state they contain, thus separating configuration files
from files that contain mostly task-dependent or time-dependent
state.
4.2 Filters
SAIC uses three filters to screen out files that do not hold applica-
tion state. By our definition, application state must persist for the
lifetime of the application. The first filter removes files that have
been deleted by the application, which, as a result, cannot hold
state that persists for the application’s lifetime. The second filter
requires the file to be read before it is written by an application,
implying that the state held in that file persists across executions
of the application. Any file that does not fall in this category only
contains temporary state for a particular execution since there was
no information flow from previous executions. Examples of files
removed by these filters include lock files and files used as unidirec-
tional communication channels between two processes. There is
one exception to this case – many applications will write a default
configuration file the first time they are run if the old configuration
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Figure 5: Similarity for prefs.js (96%) and session.rdf (55%).
The shaded region denotes v × n in Equation 1. Note that
the lower graph has been truncated, and actually has 17287
unique chunk values.
file is deleted or if there has been a major update. Thus, this filter
requires a file to be written before it is read more than 20% of the
time it is opened before it is removed from consideration. These
two filters eliminate files that only hold temporary execution state
and not application state. The final filter removes user data files
from consideration. For the applications we analyzed in this paper,
a simple filter that removes files that are in user home directories
and do not have a directory starting with “.” in their path is able to
remove all user data files. In practice though, a more sophisticated,
domain specific filter would likely be necessary.
4.3 Similarity Metric
After the filters have been applied, SAIC separates configuration
state from task-dependent and time-dependent state by computing
the similarity among versions of a file. The key insight behind
this heuristic is that configuration state changes much more slowly
than both task-dependent and time-dependent state. This is because
changing tasks and timed events occur regularly in an application’s
use, but changing configuration is a rare event. Thus, to separate
configuration state from other application state, SAIC identifies file
chunks that remain unchanged across versions of a file. A file that
contains a high proportion of constant chunks is likely to contain
a large amount of configuration state, and thus will be identified as
a configuration file.
To correctly capture this similarity, our algorithm must be tol-
erant to insertions and deletions, since fields in configuration files
may change in size. In addition, we have observed that applications
tend to read and parse an entire configuration file, modify it while
in memory and then periodically write out the entire configuration
file. Because of this, independent portions of the file may also be
arbitrarily reordered. For example, the Firefox configuration file
pluginreg.dat contains information about plugins in a list format.
The order that the plugins appear in the list has no meaning and
changes arbitrarily among versions.
To meet these requirements, we use an algorithm similar to the
one used by LBFS to find similar chunks of data for data compression
in a distributed file system [35]. Files are divided into variable sized
chunks by selecting certain offsets within the file to be anchors.
The location of the anchors is determined by computing Rabin
fingerprints [42] on an 8 byte sliding window over the entire file.
We then randomly select 1/16 of the values to be anchors, giving
an expected chunk size of 16 bytes. Since the anchors are based
on the file contents instead of fixed sized offsets, an insertion or
deletion will only affect at most two chunks and leave the remaining
chunks in the file unchanged. We note that our window and chunk
sizes are considerably smaller than those used in LBFS because our
goal is to identify tokens that appear across a file’s lifetime, not to
optimize the use of network bandwidth. Thus, the chunk size is
chosen to be on the order of the expected storage required for a
single configuration setting.
We call the contents of each chunk the chunk value and compute
the frequency of each chunk value over all versions of a file.
A file with high similarity will have many chunk values that
appear in a large portion of its versions. Conversely, a file with low
similarity will have many chunk values that appear in only a few
of its versions. To assign a numeric score to a file’s similarity across
versions we compute the following ratio:
Similarity =
∑n
i=0 ci
v × n (1)
where n is the average number of unique chunks in each version of
the file, ci is the number of occurrences of the ith chunk when the
chunks are sorted in descending order by frequency of occurrence
across the different versions, and v is the number of versions of the
file recorded. Intuitively, similarity is the ratio between the sum
of the occurrences of the n most frequent chunks in the file, over
a similar sized file that does not change at all – i.e. each chunk
appears in every version. To illustrate, Figure 5 compares the chunk
distribution for a configuration file, prefs.js and a non-configuration
file, session.rdf. A large proportion of chunks in prefs.js appear in
every version of the file, so the rectangle representing v × n is
almost entirely covered (96%) by the histogram. On the other hand,
session.rdf experiences much lower similarity among its versions,
and has a long tail of low frequency chunks extending beyond the
shaded rectangle. As a result, the histogram covers a much smaller
portion of the rectangle (55%).
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Computing Similarity
Our prototype consists of a tool to compute similarity of a file’s
versions and a versioning file system, which is implemented by
the redo logs maintained by the kernel module that we used in
Section 2.3 to collect our user traces. When running in regular
system operation mode, it first applies the three filters to see which
file’s similarity should be computed, and assigns a similarity score of
zero to those files that do not pass the filters. For each file that is not
removed by the filters, the similarity computation tool extracts each
version of the file from the redo log maintained by the versioning
file system and computes overlapping Rabin fingerprints, which
it uses to select anchors to delimit file chunks. Because the chunk
1: function Trigger Similarity
2: i ← 1
3: v ← next_version() ▷ Get the first version
4: while i < M do
5: if more_versions() then
6: x ← next_version()
7: else
8: return NULL ▷ Not enough versions yet
9: end if
10: if timestamp(x ) − timestamp(v) > T then
11: v ← x
12: i ← i + 1
13: end if
14: end while
15: return v
16: end function
Figure 6: Function for determining when to perform a simi-
larity measurement. If there are not enough versions to get
M sampling periods of lengthT , the function returns NULL.
values have varying lengths, a hash function is applied to them
and the result is then inserted into a hash table that maintains a
running count of how many times a chunk value has appeared.
This process is repeated for each file version, thus computing how
many times each chunk values appears across all versions of the
file. If a chunk value appears multiple times in any particular file
version, it is only counted once so that the count of any hash value
cannot exceed the number of file versions. Finally, these counts are
used as described by Equation 1 and the score is assigned to the file.
Since configuration files do not become non-configuration files or
vice-versa, SAIC only runs the tool once per file, thus keeping the
performance requirements of SAIC low. Once a file is assigned a
score it maintains that score until it is deleted from the file system.
5.2 Triggering Similarity Measurements
While SAIC’s similarity algorithm is effective at identifying config-
uration files, an important requirement is that SAIC must be able to
provide online measurements to a versioning file system efficiently.
During regular operation, SAIC only invokes the similarity tool
when there are idle cycles available on the processor. This is done to
minimize the impact of SAIC on the usability of the user’s machine.
While the number of cycles allocated to SAIC will depend on the
load on the machine, we assume that SAIC must have very meager
resource requirements, and must be tolerant to bursty resource
availability. As a result, SAIC cannot take a measurement after
every file modification. Despite this, we expect SAIC to produce ac-
curate measurements in a timely manner so that the versioning file
system can make informed decisions about which files to discard
when it hits its space quota. Thus, to make the best use of the few
cycles allocated to it, SAIC must trigger a similarity measurement
only on files that have had enough activity to produce an accurate
similarity score.
Finding the correct time to take such a measurement is an impor-
tant factor in the effectiveness of SAIC. On the one hand, waiting
too long to take a measurement carries several risks. First, the
versioning file system may mistakenly continue to version a non-
configuration file and instead discard a configuration file’s versions
because SAIC has not given it the information necessary to make
a correct decision. Second, SAIC’s run time increases with the
number of file versions it must process. Finally, all files that are
modified exhibit decreasing similarity over time, but the rate of
similarity decrease in configuration files is much lower than in
non-configuration files. However, waiting too long to compute a
similarity measurement of a configuration file will give it an artifi-
cially low score, causing it to be incorrectly discarded.
On the other hand, like all statistical analysis, SAIC can produce
noisy results if run over too little data. As a result, taking a measure-
ment too early can give an inaccurate score due transient events on
the file. For example, some configuration files experience a large
number of changes when they are first created, and then eventually
settle into a more representative pattern of low activity. Taking
a similarity measurement during the transient at the beginning
would produce an artificially low similarity score. Thus, it is critical
that SAIC picks the correct time to take a measurement of a file
and that the time of measurement be normalized across all files.
Our initial thought was that there exists a fixed number of ver-
sions after which a similarity measurement would return an accu-
rate result. This turned out to be false because the rate at which
new versions are created varies greatly from file to file. As a re-
sult, using a fixed number of versions would give files that are
modified very often an artificially high similarity score because
no task-dependent or time-dependent events will have occurred
between versions created extremely close together. In other words,
when files are rapidly modified, the changes between each version
are small, making the file have an apparently high similarity.
This observation made us realize that an algorithm to pick the
correct measurement time must take into account not only the
number of versions of a file that exist, but also the time over which
the versions are created. Such an algorithm should discount ver-
sions created close together since it is unlikely that there was an
intervening task-dependent or time-dependent event and reward
versions created farther apart in time. To do this, we defer comput-
ing a similarity measurement until a file has hadM modifications,
each of which are at leastT hours apart. In other words, there must
be at leastM non-overlapping time periods of lengthT that contain
at least one new file version.
The point at which SAIC computes similarity for a file is called
the trigger point and is found by using the trigger function described
in Figure 6. We callT the sampling period andM the sample length.
The trigger function will return the version at which a measure-
ment should be taken if enough versions of the file have been
generated in the versioning file system. If there have not been
enough versions, then the function returns NULL. Ideally, the sam-
ple period should be long enough to contain one task-dependent or
time-dependent event. Thus, using file versions across a number of
sample periods will contain enough task-dependent changes that
non-configuration files that contain task-dependent state will pro-
duce a lower similarity score than configuration files that contain
mainly configuration state. In practice, we have found that a sample
period of 3 hours and a sample length of 12 works fairly well.
In recovery mode, the user may need the score of a file that has
not reached its trigger point yet, and thus has not had a similarity
measurement performed on it. In this case, SAIC computes the
similarity on all versions up to the point that the recovery is taking
place and uses that similarity score instead. This score is only used
temporarily during recovery as a best approximation of what the
trigger point score would be. It is discarded after the user returns
to regular operation and the file must still reach its trigger point
before SAIC will assign a permanent score to it.
5.3 Improving Performance
During regular operation, we found that some files took a long time
to compute their similarity scores. However, in this mode, SAIC
must produce similarity scores quickly and without the need for
a large amount of resources. There are a number of operations
that scale with the aggregate size of the file versions used in the
computation. For example, the time to extract file versions, the
number of Rabin fingerprints to compute and the number of hash
computations all increase with the number of versions and the
size of the file. Another source of overhead is the the size of the
chunk value hash table. For a file with extremely low similarity and
large aggregate size of file versions, the number of unique chunk
values can become very large. This added memory pressure results
in thrashing on the machine and greatly degrades performance.
As a result, the overhead of the similarity computation is deter-
mined by the file’s similarity, the size of the file and the number of
versions used in the similarity computation. Since we can’t control
the size or similarity of the file, we must reduce the number of ver-
sions used to make these files practical to measure. We employ the
sampling periods used in the triggering function and use only the
first sample of each sample period for the similarity computation,
discarding the rest of the versions within the sampling period. In
this way, the number of versions used in the similarity computation
is bounded byM , which is 12 in our prototype. The intuition behind
why this approximation works is that even if the rate of change of a
file is significantly faster than the sampling period, the samples will
still capture the cumulative changes and produce a similarity score
close to the one that would have been achieved by sampling all
versions. The only case where the scores may significantly differ is
if a file was being modified in a cyclic way, and eventually returned
back to a state in a previous version. We did not observe any files
that displayed this behavior. We will compare the scores derived
using sampling and using all versions in Section 6.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Identifying Configuration Files
We now evaluate SAIC’s ability to identify configuration files. Sev-
eral metrics are of importance for SAIC. One such metric is the
percentage of non-configuration file versions SAIC eliminates. This
number tells us how many fewer file rollbacks a user must perform
when trying to find the most recently working application config-
uration. As a result, it can be used as an indicator of how much
effort SAIC will save the user during recovery. Another useful met-
ric is the amount of versioning space SAIC has saved. This saves
the versioning file system from versioning files unnecessarily, thus
either reducing the space overhead of the versioning file system
or allowing it to maintain longer file histories. Finally, we would
like to evaluate SAIC’s accuracy by measuring its true positive and
false positives when identifying files. We define a true positive as
when SAIC correctly identifies a configuration file, and a false posi-
tive as when SAIC incorrectly identifies a non-configuration file
as a configuration file. We do not evaluate the overhead of the file
system versioning in SAIC because we have not made any effort to
optimize the kernel module that was performing the file versioning.
The overheads of optimized versioning file systems have been well
studied in the literature [13, 34, 43].
We evaluate each of the three implementation options described
in Section 5. First, we evaluate the accuracy of SAIC when applied
to all file versions in our two traces. We then compare the accuracy
of this option to SAIC using the trigger function described in Sec-
tion 5.2 and then finally the option using the sampling performance
enhancement described in Section 5.3.
6.2 Similarity Evaluation
We began by using SAIC to measure similarity across all versions of
all files in our trace. As described in Section 4.1, SAIC first applies
a set of filters to remove non-application state files. We found
that these filters play an important role because a large portion
of versioned files are actually removed from further consideration
by these filters. This is beneficial because the filters are far more
efficient than the similarity tool. Table 4 shows the number of files
filtered out for each application by each filter. The passed filter
column indicates the number of application state files that are not
removed by the filter, which will have the similarity calculation
applied to them. We verified that none of the files removed by the
filters were configuration files. As we can see, the majority of files
modified by each application actually consist of temporary and
non-persistent files.
Next the tool computes the similarity scores of all the files that
passed the filters. Most configuration files scored greater than the
majority of non-configuration files. To illustrate, Figure 7 shows a
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which shows what
the accuracy of SAIC would be at similarity thresholds of 60%,
70%, 80%, 90% and 95%. Files with scores above the threshold are
identified as configuration files and files below the threshold are
identified as non-configuration files. The ROC curve plots the true
positive rate versus the false positive rate. The true positive rate is
defined as the number of true positives over the actual number of
configuration files, while the false positive rate is the number of
false positives over the number of non-configuration files that were
not removed by the filters. For readability, we only show curves for
the four applications which have the most versioned files.
In reality, SAIC’s versioning file system does not use an explicit
threshold to determine whether a file should be versioned or not.
Rather, this threshold is determined implicitly by howmuch space is
available for versioning – the versioning file system simply discards
the lowest scoring file when it is low on space. As a result, the
more storage is allocated, the lower the implied threshold, although
the precise relationship between version storage and similarity
threshold will depend on the amount of versioning activity and the
size of the files currently in the version store. From the curve we
see that as the point moves to the right along the curves, which
means threshold is becoming lower, both the false positive and false
negative rates will rise. The closer a point is to the upper left corner
(100% true positives with no false positive) the better the operating
point. The important thing to note is that the curves are all well
above the “line of no discrimination” (x = y), indicating that SAIC
generally has a higher true positive rate than false positive rate. By
computing the Euclidean distance between each of the operating
points and the upper left corner, we determine that the optimal
operating point for the files in our trace is a similarity threshold
of 82%. 90% of all configuration have similarity scores above this
threshold and the false positive rate at this operation point is 35%.
At this point SAIC will eliminate 85% of all non-configuration file
versions and save 77% of versioning space in the redo logs. We
note that with a threshold of 55% SAIC is capable of identifying
all configuration files while still correctly eliminating 30% of non-
configuration files. At this operating point, SAIC suffers only 33
false positives across both traces and is able to eliminate roughly
66% of non-configuration file versions from its redo log.
To evaluate the number of versions SAIC can eliminate and space
SAIC can save, we will use the 80% similarity threshold as our as-
sumed operating point. Table 5 gives the number of true positives,
the number of false positives and the number of false negatives
(configuration files wrongly identified as non-configuration files).
To evaluate the amount of effort the user saves during rollback,
we provide the number of non-configuration file versions elimi-
nated over the total number of non-configuration file versions. The
amount of space saved is given by the amount of non-configuration
file space saved in the redo logs over the total space used to version
non-configuration files. Any of the versions eliminated or space
that was not saved is a result of false positives. We can see that SAIC
will help the user tremendously during recovery for a majority of
the applications by correctly identifying all non-configuration files
and eliminating them from consideration during recovery, leaving
only actual configuration files for the user to try to recover with.
Similarly, nearly all the versioning space that would have been
wasted on non-configuration files is saved. The only exception was
the Flash application in Trace 2. Here, the vast majority of all ver-
sions not eliminated were the result of a single false positive file,
clearspring.sol, which had 787 versions and a similarity score of
87%.
Only Firefox had significant numbers of false positives. Of these,
two files, cookies.sqlite and places.sqlite, account for 99.9% of the
misidentified versions, which were not eliminated as a result. These
files have a common characteristic – they are histories of user
activity and behave as a slowly changing cache for that activity. As
a result, even though the entries in these files are task-dependent,
some can remain in the file for a long time either because they are
used frequently or there is insufficient activity in the application to
evict them. We note that urlclassifier3.sqlite and pluginreg.dat, the
two problematic configuration files described in Appendix A, were
both correctly identified by SAIC.
Both false negatives in VMware were in a file that VMware
uses to store the user’s favorite VMs. While this is configuration
state, VMware also uses this file to store a large amount of task-
dependent state, causing the file to have low similarity. We note
that, with the exception of clearspring.sol, the false positive in the
Trace Application Versioned Files Filters PassedPersistent Read→Write User file Filter
1
Firefox 507 228 265 1 13
GNOME 392 9 363 0 20
Flash 17 12 0 0 5
VMware 189 105 7 71 6
2
Firefox 568 449 86 3 30
GNOME 493 316 151 0 26
Flash 35 24 5 0 6
JEdit 73 12 41 14 6
Amarok 89 29 51 4 5
Table 4: Filter results. This table gives the number of files removed by each of the filters. The last column indicates howmany
files from each application had the similarity computation applied to them.
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positive rate at all thresholds because all Firefox configuration files scored above 95% in that trace.
Flash application, many of the false positives have negligible impact
on the number of versions and the amount of space saved. This is
because the false positives often turned out to be short files with
few versions. We will discuss the reasons for this in Section 7.
6.3 Trigger Function Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of the trigger function, we modify
our similarity measurement tool to only compute similarity for
file versions up to the file’s trigger point and compare its accuracy
at identifying configuration files with the original tool that uses
all versions available in the trace. The results are given in Table 6.
When a file’s trigger point does not occur before the end of the trace,
we use all the versions gathered in the trace. This simulates SAIC’s
recovery mode behavior, which is to use all available versions for
files that have not reached their trigger points. On average, using a
trigger point increases the similarity score of a file by 2±6%. This
Trace Application TP FN FP Versions eliminated (%) Space Saved (MB) (%)
1
Firefox 7 0 3 258505/289356 89.3 1025/1151 89.1
GNOME 15 1 1 1737/1743 99.7 62.8/62.8 100
Flash 1 0 0 123/123 100 0.0138/0.0138 100
VMware 4 2 0 2766/2766 100 32.0/32.0 100
2
Firefox 14 1 8 422066/516984 81.6 4733/5060 93.5
GNOME 18 3 2 17056/17090 99.8 1267/1267 100
Flash 1 0 2 1190/1980 60.1 0.784/1.46 53.7
JEdit 2 0 1 4940/4956 99.7 51.5/51.5 99.8
Amarok 3 0 1 4735/4742 99.9 194/194 100
Table 5: Performance of SAIC over all versions in each trace. Here we use a similarity threshold of 80% to differentiate config-
uration files from non-configuration files. TP denotes the number of true positives, FN, the number of false negatives (config-
uration files that were not correctly identified) and FP, the number of false positives. The Versions Eliminated column gives
the number of non-configuration file versions eliminated over the total number of non-configuration file versions. Similarly,
the Space Saved column gives the amount of versioning space in MB that was eliminated over the total potential space that is
used to version non-configuration files.
Trace Application All Versions Trigger SamplingTP FP TP FP TP FP
1
Firefox 7/7 3/6 7/7 4/6 7/7 4/6
GNOME 15/16 1/4 15/16 1/4 15/16 1/4
Flash 1/1 0/4 1/1 0/4 1/1 0/4
VMware 4/6 0/0 4/6 0/0 4/6 0/0
2
Firefox 14/15 8/15 14/15 9/15 14/15 8/15
GNOME 18/21 2/5 19/21 2/5 21/21 2/5
Flash 1/1 2/5 1/1 2/5 1/1 2/5
JEdit 2/2 0/4 2/2 0/4 2/2 0/4
Amarok 3/3 0/2 3/3 0/2 3/3 0/2
Table 6: Evaluation of Trigger Function and Sampling. We show the effects of both mechanisms on the accuracy of SAIC. In
most cases, these optimizations had no effects on the accuracy. In cases where there was an effect, the change is highlighted
in bold.
was expected since most files have a decreasing similarity score
over time, so taking a measurement earlier will increase a file’s
similarity score on average. As we can see from the results, this
has a negligible effect on the effectiveness of SAIC. In two cases, a
non-configuration file had its similarity score increased to exceed
the 80% threshold and become a false positive. In both these cases,
the file was the user’s Firefox cookie jar, which increased from
79% to 98% in Trace 1 and from 73% to 85% in Trace 2. Increasing
similarity scores can also have positive results – the similarity score
of one GNOME configuration file was increased from 79% to 83%
and went from a false negative to a true positive.
The benefit of the trigger function is that SAIC can provide
results to the versioning file system much earlier. Of the 96239
versioned files in both traces, 149 files reached their trigger point
before the end of the trace. The cumulative distribution of times
to reach the trigger point for both traces is given in Figure 8 and
Figure 9. In Trace 2, which had more activity, many more files were
able to reach their trigger points with several days of activity while
in Trace 1, which had less activity, half the files took 18 or more days.
While the time for the trigger point to occur does depend heavily
on how much the application that accesses the file is used, we take
these numbers to show that SAIC can get accurate measurements
for a fair number of files within the scope of several weeks.
6.4 Sampling Evaluation
While sampling reduces the resource requirements of SAIC, we
also wanted to measure how sampling perturbs SAIC’s similarity
score as compared to computing the score with all versions up to
the trigger point. Table 6 also shows the differences in performance
when we configure SAIC to only use one file version from each
sampling period up to the trigger point versus using all versions up
to the trigger point. Sampling perturbs the similarity score of a file
by 2±7% on average and as a result has essentially no measurable
affect on the accuracy. Anecdotally, two configuration files, each of
which had a similarity score of 78%-79% when computed using all
samples up to the trigger point, had their similarity scores increased
to 80%-84% by sampling. One false positive introduced by using
the trigger function also decreased below the threshold, becoming
a true negative again. Using sampling periods decreases the time
required to analyze the files by 86% overall. In particular, some of
the larger files saw the time to compute their similarity score drop
by over 90%.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of time for files to reach
their trigger points in Trace 1.
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their trigger points in Trace 2.
7 DISCUSSION
Because SAIC’s similarity metric relies on heuristics, it can make
mistakes when these heuristics fail. As we have seen, some non-
configuration files may also exhibit high similarity by coincidence
– for example they may record user histories. However, the impact
of such errors is lessened by two properties of SAIC. First, SAIC is
more likely to classify a non-configuration file as a configuration file
than the reverse. This is because while there is non-configuration
state that can change slowly, we have not observed any configura-
tion state that changes frequently. We believe that such a situation
would only arise if a user changed configurations as often as she
changed tasks, or a bug in the application caused configurations to
spontaneously change on their own – both are exceptional circum-
stances. Hence, a misidentification will cause more than necessary
disk space to be used and extra effort during recovery, but will not
result in important file versions getting discarded. Second, because
SAIC relies on identifying common chunks in file contents over
time, it can misclassify files when there have not been enough
versions, or when the file is very small. In such cases, results can
have quite a bit of error associated with them. Fortunately, it is not
expensive to version small files with few versions, so one solution
may be to augment the file system’s versioning policy to retain
such files regardless of their similarity score.
8 RELATEDWORK
This section presents the most important research related to this
thesis. Firstly, we highlight the difference of our work with other
work in configuration management. Secondly, we explore work in
system recovery and versioning file systems. Finally, we present
work that used Rabin fingerprint.
8.1 Configuration Management
There has been a lot of interest in configuration management. Re-
cent work [22, 36–38] shows that configuration problem is a signif-
icant cause of system faults. Broadly speaking, research in this field
can be classified into three categories: providing aids to the users
to fix configuration problems, validating user actions that change
configurations, automating some error-prone tasks of configuration
management.
Much of this work [1, 4, 31, 47, 51–54] uses computers to aid the
process of configuration problem troubleshooting. Chronus [53]
searches for the time when system configuration transitioned from
a working state to a non-working configuration state. During the
diagnosis process, Chronus loads and runs historical system snap-
shots in a virtual machine monitor, and tests whether a historical
system snapshot works correctly by executing user-provided soft-
ware probes. To keep a history of the system snapshots, Chronus
logs every change to the disk in a time-traveling disk. In addition,
it uses binary search to speed up the search of the state transition
point.
SAIC is inspired by the idea of searching for historical working
state of Chronus. However, it differs from Chronus in two ways.
First, a major problem of the Chronus method is that it can not
differentiate configuration-related disk block changes with user
data-related disk block changes. Thus it can inadvertently cause
user data loss with its indiscriminating disk block roll back. Chronus
solved the problem by rolling back only configuration-related file
changes. Second, binary search can not guarantee to find the latest
working state if there are multiple working state to non-working
state transitions. SAIC ensures that the latest working state is found
by using linear search.
Autobash [47] and its successor [4] help a user to locate existing
solutions to configuration problems. They maintain a database of
user actions to known configuration problems and uses a trial-and-
fail approach to test candidate solutions. To ensure that an incorrect
solution does not leave persistent changes to the system, they apply
each candidate solution in a speculative environment. Any persis-
tent changes made by a solution can be undone if the solution is
not appropriate for the configuration problem that the user is trou-
bleshooting. Like Chronus, they execute user-specified software
predicates to automatically test whether the configuration problem
is solved or not. In addition, they leverage causality-tracking and
analysis to decrease the time for finding and testing solutions. Most
recently, Su et al. [48] further enhances Autobash by using heuris-
tics algorithms to automatically find user actions that are used to
test system states as software predicates.
While Autobash allows a user to learn from other users that
experiences the same or similar configuration problems, it can not
solve the problems that do not have existing solutions. SAIC is able
to fix these kind of problems since it can find out the historical state
when the user’s system was working.
PeerPressue [51] and its predecessor, Strider [52] uses statistical
analysis to find the root causes of misconfigurations. They maintain
a database that stores the system state of a large body of computers.
To diagnose a configuration problem, they first trace the faulty
application and use causality-tracking to find suspect Windows
registry entries that may cause the configuration problem. Then
they retrieve the same set of entries from the system state of other
computers from the database. Finally, all these entries are used in
Bayesian statistical estimations to calculate the probability for each
entry to be the root cause.
Like other statistical approaches, the success of PeerPressure in
finding the correct root causes of misconfigurations for an applica-
tion requires the use of a large set of system states from computers
that runs the same application. This requirement may be feasible
for enterprise users that have a large number of installations of
computers that run the same set of applications. But it is difficult
for an individual user to collect this kind of information from other
people’s computers. A software vendor is also unlikely to do so
due to privacy and other issues. SAIC avoids this kind of problems
since it does not need information from other users’ computers.
Some research [36, 37] provide frameworks to validate configu-
ration changes before they are put in effect on production systems.
Nagaraja et al. [36] explored the nature of operator mistakes with
operator experiments on system maintenance and troubleshooting
tasks. They implemented a prototype validation framework with
two alternative techniques: trace-based validation and replica-based
validation. Oliveria et al. [37] conducted a survey on a group of
database administrators to study database configuration problems.
They introduced a new model-based validation technique in its
validation framework, which is based on [36]. Both studies indi-
cate that operator mistakes are significant source of system faults.
The experiments with these validation frameworks illustrate that
they can effectively detect and prevent some operator mistakes,
but they miss a considerable number of operator mistakes due to
the complexity of the interactions between the operator and the
system.
Others [2, 3, 9, 55] have proposed to use computers to accomplish
some of the most tedious and error-prone tasks of configuration
management. These systems allow the user to specify the rules that
the system will follow to automatically generate configuration files.
They usually provide the user with some high-level language di-
rectives or templates that define how the configuration files should
be generated under certain circumstances. Although they relieve
some of the burden of configuration management from the users,
they still rely on the user to supply error-free rules, which can
become complicated since there are numerous different kinds of
circumstances in which a configuration file needs to be changed.
8.2 System Recovery
Computer systems can fail for many different reasons [19]. It has
been reported that software bugs and operator mistakes are the
most significant sources of system failures [5, 20, 22, 30, 36, 37]. De-
spite the fact that many mechanisms have been proposed to detect
software bugs or to identify operator mistakes, many bugs or oper-
ator mistakes still bypass the detections and cause system failures,
largely due to the sophisticated nature of these issues. Consequently,
we believe a more pragmatic solution is to enable computer systems
to automatically recover from failures. We present here some of
the primary work in this field.
Previous work has used reboot or restart techniques, including
whole program restart [19, 49], microreboot [10], and software
rejuvenation [26, 50] to bring the system to a clean state after sys-
tem failures. Whole software restart can cause substantial software
down time, although it is the most effective way to recover from
some system failures. Microreboot reduces restart time by recur-
sively restarting the smallest recoverable component, a software
module for example, to the entire software. In many cases, a soft-
ware module restart can restore the availability of the system and
it incurs much less time than a entire software restart. However,
being able to microreboot requires the software to be built as a
collection of "recoverable" components. While legacy applications
can not enjoy this technique, many complicated applications will
be difficult or nearly impossible to be designed this way.
Checkpoint and recovery [6, 24, 27, 28, 39, 41, 44] is another
important failure recovery technique. It reduces system down time
by periodically taking a checkpoint of the system state and restart-
ing the system from a prior checkpoint. A checkpoint consists of
at least the memory state of one or more applications [16]. Many
times it also includes a partial or full file system snapshot. The
checkpoints can be stored to disk, non-volatile memory, or remote
systems.
Rx [41] periodically uses light-weight checkpoint techniques
that store a snapshot of an application in main memory and keep
a copy of each accessed files of the application. When a software
failure is detected in the application, Rx rolls back the application
to a recent checkpoint and re-executes the application in a modified
environment. This mechanism is able to recover the application
frommany memory management related problems such as memory
corruption and double free, certain non-deterministic software bugs
such as race conditions, or user requests based problems that are
triggered from some user requests or inputs.
ASSURE [44] identifies an application’s rescue points, which are
locations in the existing application code for handling failures, and
inserts checkpoint and rollback code into the system with runtime
binary injection. It first discovers candidate rescue points in an
application offline by exploring the call-graphs of the application’s
executions when failure handling code is being triggered. An online
test is then used to determine which candidate rescue point is most
effective. The selected rescue point is inserted into the application
in the production environment at runtime. When a fault occurs
in the application, ASSURE restores execution to an appropriate
rescue point and uses the applications own failure handling code
to recovery from the fault.
Furthermore, work by others [11, 29] has shown that application-
specific knowledge is necessary to recover from many kinds of
application faults. Brown et al. build an e-mail store system [8]
that is capable of rolling back and replaying application-specific
user operations. Each user operation is converted into verbs, which
is an encapsulation of all the operations needed to re-execute or
compensate a user operation, and is recorded into a timeline log on
disk by an undo manager. During the troubleshooting process, the
user can edit the timeline log to remove, replace, or add verbs. The
undo manager then re-executes the appropriate part of the timeline.
This mechanism reflects the Rewind, Repair, and Replay model [7]
that allows a user to repair a problem without losing work that was
performed after the time at which the problem occurred.
8.3 Versioning File Systems
Versioning file systems keep a history of changes made to the
file system to provide the ability to recover from file system re-
lated faults. Research in the field of versioning file systems can be
classified into comprehensive versioning file systems, open-close
versioning file systems, and snapshots versioning file systems,.
Comprehensive versioning file systems [13, 46] create a new
version for every write to the file system. This approach provides
the finest granularity of versioning. Wayback [13] is a user-level
versioning file system built on the FUSE framework [15]. It logs
the data to be overwritten or truncated into an undo log before
any overwriting or truncating is performed. Our versioning file
system uses an undo log similar to that of Wayback, but it is not
implemented as a user-level file system. Rather it is implemented
as a kernel module that intercepts file system calls made by user
applications to create versions. The main drawback of a compre-
hensive versioning file system is the space overhead required since
a great number of versions are created.
Open-close versioning file system [43] create a new version
for all the writes occurs in a session of an open and a close of
a file. The Elephant file system [43] is a versioning file system
that provides users with a range of version retension policies. One
interesting retention policy, called Keep Landmarks, retains only
landmark versions in a file’s history. A landmark version can either
be specified by the user or automatically identified with heuristics,
which is based on the assumption that versions generated within a
short time period will be indistinguishable to the user if the versions
were generated a long time ago.
Recently, Muniswamy-Reddy et al. proposed a versioning file
system [33] that leverages the causal relationships among files. It
aims to gain the benefits of both open-close versioning file systems
and comprehensive versioning file systems by creating a new ver-
sion only when a new causal relationship is observed between a
process and a file. This limits the number of versions to be created
while preserving sufficient causality information for the recovery.
Snapshots versioning file systems [25, 40] create versions for the
entire file system. Each version is a snapshot or an image of the
file system. Due to the overhead of taking and saving file system
snaphot, these systems usually create versions periodically to avoid
disrupting normal user operations.
8.4 Rabin fingerprints
Rabin fingerprinting schema [42] generates a fingerprint for a string
by using randomly chosen irreducible polynomials. It guarantees
the probability of a collision when two different strings have the
same fingerprint can be made to be very small by choosing a suffi-
cient number of bits to represent the fingerprint. It is widely used
by string-matching and hashing algorithms since it is fast and is
easy to implement.
Several systems have also used Rabin fingerprints to detect simi-
larity across files. LBFS [35] uses it to detect similar chunks among
different files for the purposes of optimizing bandwidth usage in
a distributed files system. It divides the files it stores into chunks
and indexes the chunks by the Rabin fingerprint of the chunks.
It improves transmitting performance by avoiding transmitting
a file chunk if any file on the recipient contains the same chunk.
Forman et al. [17] use it to find similar documents to help manage
large document repositories. Rabin fingerprints were also used by
Earlybird [45] and Autograph [23] to detect common substrings in
network traffic to detect Internet worms.
9 CONCLUSIONS
Without knowledge of which files contain configuration state, try-
ing to revert a misconfigured application back to a working state
is a daunting task. In addition to configuration state, applications
maintain a variety of task-dependent and time-dependent applica-
tion state strewn across files, all of which are difficult to distinguish
from configuration state. SAIC solves this problem by using a statis-
tical approach that measures the similarity of a file over its versions.
We find that with 3 simple filters that remove non-persistent files,
temporary files and user data files, and a similarity metric that
measures how chunks persist over the lifetime of a file, SAIC is able
to differentiate configuration files from non-configuration files. By
identifying configuration files, it reduces the number of files the
user must examine for rollback by one to two orders of magnitude.
SAIC can operate at various similarity thresholds, which are
implicitly determine by the amount of versioning storage space.
Depending on the threshold, it can identify between 60-100% of
configuration files for most applications, while suffering a false pos-
itive rate of 20-60%. With a threshold of 80%, 90% of configuration
files are correctly identified and 60% of non-configuration files are
eliminated, removing an aggregate of 713129 file versions and 7GB
of storage across two traces. SAIC’s resource requirements are low
due to two mechanisms. A trigger point function that determines
an optimal measurement point by ensuring that a file’s versions
have covered a sufficiently long period of time, allows SAIC to
take only one measurement per file. Further, the cost of similarity
computation is reduced by using a sampling method that performs
the computation on fewer versions. Both of these enhancements
have negligible effects on the accuracy of SAIC, so we believe they
should be used continuously during regular operation.
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A APPLICATION INFORMATION
Firefox is a full featured web browser. While Firefox spreads its
configuration over a large number of files, two of those files1, url-
classifier3.sqlite, which contains a blacklist of phishing sites and
pluginreg.dat, which records associations of plugins with MIME
types account for over 95% of the configuration file versions in
Trace 1 and over 99% of the configuration file versions in Trace 2.
Strangely, we observed that Firefox frequently changes the order
in which the MIME associations appeared in the file, even though
the order of appearance has no effect on their semantic meaning
– an example of the arbitrary and senseless behavior that all ap-
plications exhibit to some degree. While the meaning of the file
contents has not changed, these updates cause the file contents
to change and thus results in a new version being created. Some
examples of Firefox non-configuration files include sessionstore.js,
which records task-dependent session information, which is used
to reinitialize the state of the browser after a crash, as well as files
that store task-dependent browsing state such as a history of form
field values and the user’s cookie jar.
GNOME represents the GNOME desktop system, which includes
session manager, window manager, power manager, screen saver,
GConf configuration system, as well as GNOME applications come
with the default GNOME desktop installtion. Instead of manag-
ing their own configuration settings, many GNOME applications
choose to use the GConf configuration system to access, modify,
and maintain their configurations. In both Trace 1 and Trace 2,
all the GNOME configuration files were accessed and modified by
GConf configuration system.
1A reference for Firefox files can be found at
http://kb.mozillazine.org/Profile_folder_-_Firefox
Flash represents the Macromedia Flash plugin. This plugin only
has one global configuration file and caches many website specific
settings. These website specific settings are updated less frequently
than the global configuration file.
VMware workstation is a popular hypervisor. It has 3 config
files and the user in Trace 1 used it under two users for a total of 6
configuration files in the trace. VMware creates a large number of
temporary lock files and log files.
JEdit is a JAVA-based editor. It has two configuration files and
several history files that store recently opened files and a history
of user actions.
Amarok is an open-source music player that uses the KDE
framework. It has two configuration files. It stores user listening
habits and song rankings in an sqlite database file which we classify
as a non-configuration file because its contents are largely task-
dependent.
